15

KIERKEGAARD AND HEIDEGGER ON "PATHOS-FILLED TRANSITION"

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> But the persons whose souls do not know this depression are those whose souls have no presentiment of a metamorphosis.
>
> (Judge William, *Either/Or*, Part II; EO II: 190)

Kierkegaard and Heidegger both place fundamental emphasis on the possibility of personal transformation, that is, a radical change in an individual's commitments and self-understanding. I argue that juxtaposing them can illuminate some key dynamics in post-Hegelian debates over such change, its limits, conditions, and the forms it can and should take. I concentrate on what Kierkegaard calls "pathos-filled transition", a transformation in which a specific emotion, broadly construed, plays a central role.

The idea that emotions, *pathe*, are central to individual development and transformation is evidently an ancient one. Aristotelian virtue, for example, foregrounds the careful cultivation of affective response. It is a cultivation in which action and reason have a clear priority: for Aristotle, we become virtuous by doing virtuous acts, and, in achieving virtue, the *pathe* accept reason's authority, as a servant does their master's.[1] By the modern period, these assumptions and others, such as Aristotle's focus on the education of the young, have been problematized. The result is a complex and ambiguous picture, one in which the balance between active and passive transformation or between praise-worthy and pathological emotions is frequently blurred. As we will see, in both their points of agreement and disagreement, Kierkegaard and Heidegger exemplify that modern shift in how we understand transformation.

Before proceeding, a few introductory remarks, textually and conceptually. My principal focus is Kierkegaard's 1843 *Either/Or* and Heidegger's 1927 *Being and Time*. I say "Kierkegaard's", but, of course, there is the immediate complexity of pseudonymous authorship which has no parallel in Heidegger's work: *Being and Time,* whilst a markedly syncretic text and obviously massively complex exegetically, operates with a single authorial voice throughout, Heidegger's own. In contrast, *Either/Or* operates at multiple removes: officially a collection of papers found by chance by a pseudonymous editor, it embeds a series of narratorial voices, one within another as "in a Chinese-box puzzle" (EO I: 9). At its heart is a contrast between a set of documents from "A" defending an "aesthetic" stance on life and letters from "B", later identified as Judge

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William, to "A", urging him to transform his life, and to live "ethically" (EO I: 13). One of my central concerns will be the contrast between this possible transformation and those mapped by Heidegger, particularly in his anxiety-ridden vision of authenticity.

With respect to Kierkegaard, I will follow the standard procedure of attributing views to the various pseudonymous authors, where they exist, for the obvious reason that it is open how much his views coincide with those of A or Judge William or Climacus or etc. With respect to Heidegger, I focus primarily on the "early Heidegger", that is, on his work up to the mid-1930s, but one consequence of my approach is to highlight continuities between his early work and his later writings. I side-step textual complexities when not directly relevant. For example, I ignore the difference Heidegger sometimes draws between two terms for "Being", "*Sein*" and "*Seyn*", and his technical term "Dasein" can be read harmlessly here as "human existence".

I spoke of "transformation in which a specific emotion, broadly construed, plays a central role". Let me say immediately that "emotion" is a rough term, but not, I think, a misleading one for current purposes. Both Kierkegaard and pseudonyms such as Climacus equate "pathos" with "passion" [*Lidenskab*] (CUP: 33, JP III: 427). Heidegger equates "pathos", particularly in an Aristotelian context, with his own conception of mood [*Stimmung*] (compare BT: 137–8 and Ga18: 262–3).[2] In both cases, there is clear overlap with what we could call "emotions". Heidegger, for example, focuses on fear, boredom, and anxiety; Climacus gives "guilt-consciousness" and "love" as paradigm examples of *pathe*.[3] One project would be to drill down on the general structure of these mental states: what exactly separates a mood from a feeling from an emotion from an affect? But that is not my aim here. Instead, I want to examine how Kierkegaard and Heidegger use specific forms of emotion as vehicles for personal transformation.

I begin by identifying some underlying communalities in their approaches: both seek to problematise dualisms between active and passive transformation and between rational and irrational transformation. I then analyse two cases: the relationship between the Aesthete A and Judge William in Parts I and II of *Either/Or* and that between the inauthentic and authentic in Divisions I and II of *Being and Time*. In both the key "pathos" is one which is now largely medicalised, namely melancholy or depression [*Tungsind*] in *Either/Or*, and anxiety [*Angst*] in *Being and Time*.[4] Examining the comparative roles of these emotions can tell us a significant amount about the scope and limits of the philosophy of transformation in post-Hegelian European thought.

15.1 Active/Passive and Rational/Irrational Transformation

Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger consistently seek to analyse cases of deep personal change, encompassing an individual's values, affects, self-understanding, and choices. It will be helpful to begin by highlighting some of the relevant commonalities. First, I take the issue of active and passive transformation.

As Anti-Climacus observes, radical or "qualitative" personal transformation is not like growing "teeth, a beard", something which can occur independent of the subject's engagement: I can grow a beard in a coma (SuD: 58). This is because a shift in how I evaluate things, what commitments I make, is necessary: transformation must be something I *do* in a relatively thick sense. But, the more radical the change, the less likely it is that my prior self had sufficient resources to initiate it: instead, it becomes natural to appeal to some "external" intervention, some Pauline moment, either in divine form or via a life event. Transformation becomes something that happens *to me*.

Clearly, we need some account of how these active and passive dynamics inter-relate. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger were extremely familiar with this question in a theological context.

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They were equally hostile to crude Pelagianism, that is, the idea that we can earn salvation via our own intrinsic resources, and to its simplistic contrary, what Kierkegaard called a "fatalistic election by grace" (JP IV: 352).[5] The challenge is thus to find some more sophisticated model for the active and passive dimensions of personal transformation.

To see how this plays out, consider their common trope of the "leap" [*Spring*, *Sprung*]. Kierkegaard famously asks whether such a leap is necessary for qualitative or radical change. As he puts it in a journal entry from 1842–3: "Can there be a transition from quantitative qualification to a qualitative one without a leap? And does not the whole of life rest in that?" (JP I: 110) A text with obvious Heideggerian relevance, 1844's *Concept of Anxiety*, likewise observes that the "new is brought about through the leap" (CoA: 85). Heidegger himself appeals to the very same trope, particularly as he grapples with passivity in the middle period. It is a central category in the *Contributions* which appeals variously to "a leap" to another beginning, "the leap into Being [*Seyn*]" insofar as one "creates in thinking" and to philosophy itself as "leaping ahead into the utmost possible decision" (Ga65: 228, 11, 44).

I chose this motif because it exemplifies the struggle in both writers to avoid a voluntarism on which radical transformation is a matter of will. There are moments when they may appear to flirt with such a model. Kierkegaard, for example, talks of a leap or "transition to the infinite" which can be "achieved by everyone if he wills it" since "it takes only courage" (JP III: 2339). But it is clear that what he has in mind is more complex than simple resolve: even Climacus rejects voluntarism in favour of an almost Heideggerian emphasis on "the great instant of resignation", and the "unutterable sighs of prayer incommensurate with the muscular" (CUP: 345, 77). Kierkegaard's separation from his pseudonyms, of course, allow one to potentially push the point still further, with Rae relegating the very idea of a "leap" to a "Climacean category", a best attempt by a non-Christian to reconstruct a process that they do not fully understand.[6]

Heidegger obviously lacks the technique of pseudonymous distance. Instead, he must work through the same problem at a linguistic level, trying to bend the voluntarist vocabulary of the leap back against itself. Most obviously, he stresses that how far we can leap depends on where we stand and what run up we have (Ga5: 329): in terms of *Being and Time*, will is constrained by facticity. He also attempts to rework even "decision" [*Entscheidung*] as a quasi-passive notion, rendering it as "De-cision" [*Ent-Scheidung*], a state of no longer being cut off [*nicht abgeschieden von*] from Being" (Ga54: 111).[7] Such de-cision is founded not on "resolve" [*Beschluss*] but "stillness" which in turn is linked to receptivity and submission (Ga65: 101). Thinking, Heidegger's highest mode of transformation, is thus ultimately "obedient [*gehorsam*] to the voice of Being" (Ga9: 311).

In tracing the development of the leap motif, we see both authors attempting to escape any simple choice between active and passive models of transformation.[8] By extension, this creates a natural point of attack if you think they lapsed back into that dualism. Habermas, for example, famously complained that Heidegger had oscillated from an early "decisionism" to the "submissiveness of an equally empty readiness for subjugation".[9]

The second commonality I want to highlight concerns the rationality of a given transformation. There is of course a vast literature on Kierkegaard and "irrationalism", but my interest is specifically in "pathos-filled transitions". Consider this, for example:

> If I really have a conviction (and this is a determination of spirit in the direction of spirit) then to me my conviction is higher than reasons; it is actually the conviction which sustains the reasons, not the reasons which sustain the conviction […] "Reasons" can lay an egg no more than a rooster can […] and no matter how much intercourse they have with

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> each other they never beget or bear a conviction. A conviction arises elsewhere. This is what I […] have meant with the problem: "on the distinction between a pathos-filled and a dialectical transition".
>
> (JP III: 3608)

The key is how conviction can "sustain" reasons without thereby undermining them, reducing them to instrumental or even merely "motivated" reasoning As Ferreira notes, Kierkegaard's analysis of pathos-filled change makes direct reference to "what Aristotle called an enthymeme", that is, a form of rhetorical syllogism (JP III: 20).[10] Elsewhere he tells us that even pathos-filled transition has its "dialectic", albeit "not, please note, a dialectic by which it is made sophistically relative (this is mediation)" (CUP: 439). Kierkegaard's point is that *pathe* must be open to assessment and criticism. In short, there is a *normativity of affect*: "it is just as questionable, precisely as questionable, to be pathos-filled and earnest in the wrong place as it is to laugh in the wrong place" (CUP: 439). Thus, whilst pathos-filled transitions circumvent theoretical models of rationality, such as Hegel's "mediation", they are not "simply lovely feeling, totally formless or arbitrary".[11] They transcend any simple rational/irrational distinction.

Turning to Heidegger the picture is similar. He warns against what he calls "'logic'", a set of misguided commitments whose current dominance he links to Hegel but whose roots he traces as far as Plato (Ga3: 243). But from this "it does not of course follow that a problem of the irrational" is all that remains (Ga3: 285). Rather, the task is to articulate an alternate account of transformation out of the inadequate self-understanding that Heidegger, both early and late, believes plagues modern society. To do that, he argues we need to focus on the role of emotions, particularly "fundamental moods" (*Grundstimmung*) and, as in Kierkegaard, there is a clear normativity in play. For example, Heidegger argues that the Platonic or Aristotelian notions of wonder led to a misguided focus on entities and should be replaced by alternatives, for example, *Verhaltenheit* ("reservedness"), which make us attentive to Being (Ga65: 11).[12]

We now have a little background in place: in stressing the role of emotion in individual transformation, both Kierkegaard and Heidegger simultaneously attempt to move beyond the traditional categories through which such processes have been understood.

15.2 Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*

Before turning to the texts, I want to explain a path not taken. Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844), attributed to the pseudonymous Vigilius Haufniensis, might seem a natural focus since it appeals to the same mood as *Being and Time*. This, of course, is no coincidence and Heidegger evidently owes a greater debt to that work than he acknowledges in three evasive footnotes which present Kierkegaard as groping towards merely ontic versions of Heidegger's own arguments (BT: 190, iv; 235, vi).[13] Many of the key themes for Heidegger's, and indeed Sartre's, treatment of anxiety are undoubtedly present in Kierkegaard's early work: its link to nothingness (CoA: 41–4), to boredom (CoA: 132–3), and to the "dizziness of freedom" (CoA: 61). There are also obvious continuities between Haufniensis' account and A's situation in *Either/Or*. As Kierkegaard observes: "Anxiety has here the same meaning as depression [*Tungsind*] at a much later point, when freedom, having passed through the imperfect forms of its history, in the profoundest sense will come to itself" (CoA: 42–3).

However, *The Concept of Anxiety* makes fundamental appeal to a theological apparatus that is hard to set in any fruitful dialogue with Heidegger. One obvious example is that Haufniensis distinguishes "subjective" and "objective" anxiety, with the latter pertaining to the whole of creation, including its non-human aspects (CoA: 57–8). This is almost unintelligible from a

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Heideggerian point of view, on which even non-human animals, let alone inanimate objects, lack a relationship to Being and to the anxiety that flows from that relationship (Ga27: 192; Ga29/30: 397, 416, 450). The worry here is not that Kierkegaard's concepts need to be scrubbed of their religious context prior to engagement with Heidegger, although that creates obvious exegetical concerns: after all, Heidegger himself does exactly that in ontologizing notions such as a Dasein's fall (BT: 176). It is that the religious context generates concepts, such as "objective anxiety" which are brutely alien to Heidegger's framework and thus to a profitable exchange with it.

This is one reason for the decision to focus on *Either/Or* instead. The other, as I hope to now show, is that the symmetries and asymmetries in the shift from A to Judge William and from the inauthentic to the authentic are particularly revealing.[14]

15.3 Pathos-Filled Transition in *Either/Or* and *Being and Time*

I will begin with some salient aspects of the possible transition mapped in *Either/Or*. First, the aesthete A repeatedly tells us that he suffers from depression. Its phenomenology is defined by a leaden lack of affect and an attendant sense that nothing matters, that it is all "utterly meaningless" (EO I: 35). Here is A himself: "If I were offered all the glories of the world or all the torments of the world, one would move me no more than the other; I would not turn over to the other side either to attain or to avoid" (EO I: 37). Cappelørn neatly glosses this as: "a state of mind that considers everything to be equally valuable, and therefore equally worthless, since reality is experienced as meaningless".[15] This naturally links to both death and to a boredom become profound weariness. Here again is A himself:

> The only thing I see is emptiness, the only thing I live on is emptiness, the only thing I move in is emptiness. I do not even suffer pain […] Pain itself has lost its refreshment for me. I am dying death […] My soul is like the Dead Sea, over which no bird is able to fly; when it has come midway, it sinks down, exhausted, to death and destruction.
>
> (EO I: 37)

Elsewhere, he talks of living "as one already dead" (EO I: 42): the one affective constant is a misery "dreadful, not to be endured" (EO I: 24). He muses on accidental death or suicide as ways out (EO I: 31; 37).

Second, A's depression is identified by Judge William as a key point of leverage in his campaign to persuade A to change his ways. As William sees it, "every aesthetic life" is ultimately misery—but what separates A from cruder aesthetes such as Don Juan is his awareness of that fact (EO II: 192).[16] Given this, A has reason to escape by transitioning to the ethical: "[w]hen one knows this, and you certainly know it, then a higher form of existence is an imperative requirement" (EO II: 192). In this sense, the experience of depression is at least a necessary condition on the transformation out of aesthetic life. "But the persons whose souls do not know this depression are those whose souls have no presentiment of a metamorphosis. I have nothing to do with them here, because I am writing only about and to you" (EO II: 190). I say "at least a necessary condition" since elsewhere Judge William is more conscious of the fragility of the move, appealing to a distinction between "depression" and "despair" [*fortvivelse*], concerned that A might forestall the slide to the latter and remain stuck in the former.

> You see, my young friend, this life is despair; if you conceal it from others, you cannot conceal it from yourself that it is despair. And yet in another sense this life is not despair. You are too light-minded [*letsindig*] to despair, and you are too heavy-minded [*tungsindig*]

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> not to come in contact with despair. You are like a woman in labor, and yet you are continually holding off the moment and continually remain in pain [...]. Her attempt to halt the process of nature would be futile, but your attempt is certainly possible.
>
> (EO II: 206)

This is not the place to address Kierkegaard's own understanding of the depression/despair distinction, but Judge William is worried that A might avoid a "rock bottom" experience which would motivate a transition to the ethical; for example, through the kind of elaborate diversion seen in the "Rotation of Crops".

Nevertheless, he clearly regards A's position as ultimately untenable. He thus immediately follows the pregnancy remark with a sketch of aesthetic existence, "the smiles of languid women", "loafing your life away in the glittering wretchedness of social gatherings", that ends with this exhortation: "But if you cannot do that, if you do not want to do that—and that you neither can nor will—then pull yourself together, stifle every rebellious thought that would have the audacity to commit high treason against your better nature" (EO II: 207). Note the modalities here: A, conscious of his own misery, "neither can nor will" ultimately remain within it. Judge William is on hand to offer some practical prescriptions, launching into an excursion on marriage: "I am a married man" (EO II: 207). Yet making the transition to the ethical will still require—and one sees here the complex interplay of active and passive flagged in §1—not only A's awareness of his own situation, nor just William's intervention, but ultimately an "act that takes all the power and earnestness and concentration of the soul" (EO II: 208).

MacIntyre famously claimed that *Either/Or* presented "no rational grounds for choice between either position", A or that of the Judge, something which "destroys the whole tradition of a rational moral culture".[17] Post-MacIntyrean commentary has been largely devoted to rejecting this. Commentators have sought to explain why A is in despair and why a shift to the ethical is at least the first step in resolving that.[18] Some, Compaijen is perhaps the most detailed example, have sought to spell out Judge William's leverage in terms of the internal/external reasons debate. The key claim is that depression supplies an internal reason, in broadly the sense defined by Bernard Williams, for A to make the transition to ethical life.

> Could A, by deliberating to the best of his ability, reach the conclusion that his desire to be rid of his depression is fulfilled in the choice to embrace ethical life? [...] My argument implies that any aesthete sufficiently like A has reason to embrace ethical life. That is, any agent who, suffering from a depression that is related to aesthetic life, desires to overcome this depression and could reach the conclusion that that desire will be fulfilled in adopting the ethical life-view, has reason to embrace ethical life. MacIntyre's charge of irrationality has thereby been debunked [...] there is internal reason for some, but not all aesthetes to live ethically.[19]

With this, we are now ready to turn to Heidegger and the comparison between depression in *Either/Or* and anxiety in *Being and Time*.

Let's begin with the immediate similarities. Heideggerian anxiety takes both incipient and full-blown forms (BT: 185–6, 189). The latter is the focus of Heidegger's analysis and here we see immediate parallels with A's self-descriptions. It consists in an experience of a loss of meaning: our world "collapses", our life and goals are reduced to "utter insignificance" (BT: 186–7). Our plans, friends, work, all appear irrelevant, inert: "the 'world' can offer nothing more, and

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neither can […] others" (BT: 187).[20] As Dreyfus and Rubin put it, "all meaning and mattering slip away", while Blattner glosses it as a "condition in which nothing matters".[21] The same could evidently apply to A:

> I don't feel like doing anything. I don't feel like riding—the motion is too powerful; I don't feel like walking—it is too tiring; I don't feel like lying down, for either I would have to stay down, and I don't feel like doing that, or I would have to get up again, and I don't feel like doing that, either. Summa Summarum: I don't feel like doing anything.
>
> *(EO I: 20)*

Indeed, Blattner directly equates Heideggerian anxiety with depression:

> What […] Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard call a "hopelessness", "intense boredom" "living under a dark cloud", and which clinicians call "flat affect": and "anhedonia" are symptoms of a depressive disorder. In such a condition, one withdraws into isolation, loses interest in the world around one, stops taking pleasure in everyday life, loses motivation to carry on. Heidegger's descriptions of what he calls "anxiety" fit this model quite well: the world "has nothing to offer" and neither do others; one cannot understand oneself anymore; one feels uncanny and not-at-home.[22]

There are very similar parallels in A's talk of excruciating boredom: this mirrors Heidegger's 1929/30 lectures which align it with anxiety. Here is his description of it: "We are sitting, for example, in the tasteless station of some lonely minor railway. It is four hours until the next train arrives. We do have a book in our rucksack, though—shall we read? No. Or think through a problem, some question? We are unable to" (Ga29/30: 140). This echoes the deep lassitude that A describes. There are also obviously close links between Heideggerian anxiety and death (BT: 266): recall A's description of his state as a "living death". But rather than digress into the exegetical complexities of what exactly Heidegger means by "*Tod*", I can rest here with the key point: there are striking phenomenological symmetries between A's state and anxiety in *Being and Time*.

There are, however, also crucial differences. Most immediately, it is central to readings such as Rudd's or Compaijen's that A's experience is a function of his distinctive worldview, one not shared even by all other aesthetes. By extension, it is central to their readings that Judge William offers some kind of *solution* to this depression, unmasking it as a consequence of a warped approach to life. These assumptions mirror the epistolary structure of the text: Judge William wants to motivate a change in A's behaviour. In Compaijen's language, he is seeking to provide A with internal reasons to advance to the ethical.

If we compare Heidegger, several points stand out. First, Heidegger presents anxiety as a function of the ontological conditions of agency: it makes manifest who we *all* really are. This explains its methodological centrality. "[We] must seek for one of the most far reaching and most primordial possibilities—one that lies in Dasein itself […] As a [mood] which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis" (BT: 182).

In contrast, *Either/Or*, especially in post-MacIntyrean readings, links depression not just to aestheticism, but to A's specific version of it. It is meant to dissipate or at least be radically ameliorated with ethical life: "as soon as this movement has occurred, the depression is essentially canceled", Judge William promises (EO II: 189). This makes perfect sense if an escape from depression is intended to motivate A's transition and solve MacIntyre's charge of irrationalism.[23] In contrast for

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Heidegger, those who minimize anxiety by suppressing its outbreaks are still ontologically defined by it and tacitly controlled by it, insofar as they are constantly fleeing from it (BT: 185–6). In sum, Heideggerian anxiety is a function of our common ontology, not any specific worldview.

Second, not only is anxiety inescapable, authentic agents are actually marked by a heighted engagement with it: they are "ready for it", rather than attempting to choke it back (BT: 260, 296). Again, this contrasts with *Either/Or*: the pathos-filled transition from A to Judge William is one of *transcending* or escaping depression. This is mirrored in the text's argumentative structure. Heidegger makes no attempt to present authenticity as attractive to the inauthentic on their own terms: for example, there is no suggestion, as in post-MacIntyrean Kierkegaard commentary, that someone can avoid this terrible mood if they make the transition. By extension, since there is no attempt to provide internal reasons for the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity, there is no need for an elaboration of the first-person perspective of the inauthentic, in the way in which *Either/Or* Part I does for the aesthete.

Third, Heidegger and Judge William *agree* that anxiety or depression reflects a felt inability to be "at home in the world" (EO II: 190; BT: 189). But they *disagree* over whether this is a deep ontological insight or a consequence of a mistaken life path: for Heidegger, the "'not-at-home' must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon", a "disclosure" or true reflection of our existence, whereas for William, here very much a Hegelian, it is a symptom of breaking off the dialectic too soon (BT: 189; EO II: 190). Exegetically, this opens the way for what one might call a Heideggerian "counter-reading" of *Either/Or.* William presents A as depressed *because* of his aesthetic approach. But, if the phenomenology of anxiety and depression reflect genuine insight, the direction may be quite the opposite: A may have to resort to aestheticism *because* he is depressed, that is, because he recognises a genuine lack of value in the social options urged on him. This is how A himself presents it: as legitimate alienation from a world in which the high point is "to become a [civil] councilor" (EO I: 34). This meshes well with Furtak's suggestion that A's issue is "a lofty conception of human dignity' rather than a need to "grow up".[24]

I began by noting certain parallelism between two hugely influential analyses of pathos-filled transition: that from A to Judge William in *Either/Or* and from inauthenticity to authenticity in *Being and Time.* We can now also see a number of structural differences.

15.4 Implications for a Philosophy of Transformation

The task now is to evaluate some of the philosophical implications of these results. Let me begin with the general issue: What are the wider implications of thinking of personal transformation in terms of a "pathos-filled transition"?

First, you will need a substantive account of the *normativity* governing the relevant emotions. This goes back to Kierkegaard's observation that it is "just as questionable, precisely as questionable, to be pathos-filled and earnest in the wrong place as it is to laugh in the wrong place" (CUP: 525). But it is broader than that: the issue is not just when to laugh, but why laughter, say, should be seen as key to the relevant transformation and indeed why laughter construed in a particular way (Dionysiac, cynical, ironic, etc.). One way to dramatize this is to note that *Being and Time* places central methodological weight on an emotion regarded by many, including Judge William, as pathological, almost delusional.

Second, assuming we cannot control our emotions in the same way we can control our will, we will need an account of how agents enter and remain in the relevant affective state. Heidegger is especially concerned by this, wondering how to formulate and support the "strange or almost insane demand" that we should become open to boredom (Ga29/30: 118).

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Third, any philosophical account of "pathos-filled transition" will need to take a position on treatments of the same emotion in other disciplines. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger provide philosophical explanations for emotions which wider society views "medically-therapeutically: And it goes without saying, *mit Pulver und mit Pillen* and then with enemas!" (CoA: 121). Heidegger, in line with his distinction between ontic first order sciences and ontological inquiry, is particularly sceptical of medicine's ability to set the conceptual framework for such analyses (BT: 247).

Suppose now we tighten the focus a little: What can these results tell us about the role of pathos-filled transition within post-Kantian European thought specifically?

First, as one sees in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, the post-Kantian discussion of personal transformation focuses overwhelmingly on adults; in marked contrast to the Aristotelian tradition, where the prime locus is the education of young people. This has a number of important implications. One is an increased emphasis on what Annas called the "jolt and shock" that might force an adult with an already developed value system into a radically different framework.[25] In Heidegger's case, this takes the form of anxiety's sudden collapse of meaning: what Withy called "a crisis of the everyday".[26] In Judge William's case, it requires a minutely calibrated epistolary intervention.

Second, and closely related, the discussion of pathos-filled transformation in adults must be equally a discussion of the *suppression* of such emotions. Both A and inauthentic Heideggerian agents are highly skilled at managing their moods, through "Rotation of Crops", on the one hand, and submersion in busy-work on the other. Ironically, one of Heidegger's examples of such "mood management" is scholarly debate on his own treatment of Kierkegaard: he complains that this serves to derail the existential debates raised by *Being and Time*, forcing it down a merely exegetical cul-de-sac (Ga94: 74; see also 39).

One case illustrates just how broad the fallout from this second issue is: a key fault line in post-Kantian philosophy is whether social roles constitute such emotional evasion. From a Heideggerian point of view, Judge William's position looks a great deal like that of the inauthentic, who have fled anxiety into the "'at-home' of publicness", the stability and security of the everyday world of "the anyone" [*das Man*] where one simply "is what one does […] One is a shoemaker, tailor, teacher, banker" (BT: 189; Ga20: 336). Read like this, *Either/Or* Part II is a story of cowardice rather than maturation. By extension, A's refusal to become "a plain John Anyman, a tiny little cog in the machine" would have some ontological legitimacy (EO II: 298). This line of thought culminates in Sartre's waiter example, in which a refusal to face up to anxiety drives an almost parodic attempt to submerge oneself in a social role.

Yet one can also see the difficulty with this line of thought, a difficulty which Judge William illustrates with his pastor example: what type of social engagement is possible if one valorizes such alienation? Even if A fulfils all the duties of a pastor, "speak[s] with more insight and seemingly with more experience about being a pastor than many a one who has been pastor for twenty years", insofar as he insists on retaining a distance between himself and the role, he "nevertheless did not become a pastor" (EO II: 165). On the one hand, the modern self is defined by an ability to step back from any and all social roles: a distancing that MacIntyre famously claimed was simply incoherent in Homeric Greece.[27] On the other hand, most post-Kantians are unwilling to appeal to any non-socially conditioned telos. The subject thus seems unable either to fully embrace the roles before it or to find an alternative to them. In A's case the result is the "living death" he describes; in Heidegger's the challenge is to explain how Dasein can live both anxiously and yet "resolutely", making concrete choices in a world that it sees as alien, "not-at-home", to some significant degree (BT: 297).

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Third, a focus on pathos-filled transition as the key mode of personal transformation immediately raises problems regarding philosophical writing. Most obviously, in rejecting traditional reason-led models of personal development, both authors seek a form of communication, be it poetic, pseudonymous, or "indirect", that will not distort or ossify the emotions they seek to describe. Furthermore, there will be a complex relation between first-personal accounts of the relevant emotions, with A and Heidegger providing detailed phenomenologies, and the subsequent theoretical analyses of such states. For example, Heidegger simultaneously privileges anxiety and yet cannot ultimately, on pain of decisionism, take at face value its presentation of the world as meaningless.[28]

Finally, much of the discussion around Kierkegaard and Heidegger focuses on the various *teloi* in play: the merits of an authentic life or a religious one or an ethical one. But it is equally important to focus on the *starting points* of the various transformations. Suppose, as Davenport does, one reads Judge William not as defending any particular life, but articulating basic conditions on agency that A fails to meet: for example, the possession of second order volitions.[29] This neutralises the "Heideggerian" move above on which A's dismissal of the ethical might be a justified response to the bourgeois framework William offers. The price is that William's attacks become incredibly narrow, applying only to A and invalid against other aesthetes, for example those with a second order principle of hedonism. Similarly with Heidegger, a huge amount will rest on how exactly we characterise not just authenticity but inauthenticity: options range from denying inauthentic agents any of the apparatus of agency, to claiming that they cannot fully commit to goals, to claiming that they can fully commit but only to the wrong things.[30] In a Kierkegaardian context, the situation is of course further complicated by other authors' treatment of Judge William; particularly Climacus' contention that "The ethicist in Either/Or" must themselves remain in despair (CUP: 216).

As I noted, the idea that emotions, *pathe*, are central to individual development and transformation is evidently an ancient one. What we see illustrated in Kierkegaard and Heidegger are key features of the modern re-imagining of that view. It is a re-imagining in which some shifts are straightforward: for example, the move away from the young, malleable learners of the Aristotelian tradition towards mature agents who will need to be shocked, wooed or argued out of engrained patterns of thought and habit. Other changes are more complex and ambiguous: the relationship between active and passive transformation and between praise-worthy and pathological emotions is profoundly blurred. I hope it is now clear how, in both their points of agreement and disagreement, Kierkegaard and Heidegger exemplify that modern transformation in how we understand transformation.[31]

Notes

1 Aristotle (1985: 1103a26-b2; 1138b11).

2 For insightful discussion of the Aristotelian links, see Withy (2015).

3 For example, "to love is straightforward pathos" (CUP: 364).

4 I follow the Hongs in using "depression" for *Tungsind* as it is the nearest current equivalent for the phenomenology which A describes. It is, however, useful to bear "melancholy" in mind precisely for its somewhat archaic overtones—one of the points touched on by William is the contemporary fashionability of the state. Cappelørn (2008) makes a complex case for "spleen", but I agree with Hannay that the term "possesses so many and even contradictory meanings in current English that it says nothing definite" (Hannay 2008: 150).

5 Heidegger is particularly opposed to Pelagianism because he links it to the Cartesian privileging of the subject, claiming that the cogito amounts to a in "an extreme pelagianism of theoretical knowing" (Ga17: 226).

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6 Rae (1997: 118n31).
7 I capitalise "Being" primarily for readability: discussion of what Heidegger means by either *Sein* or *Seyn*, and how inflationary those notions are, is beyond this piece.
8 The point holds all the more if, with Rae, one is suspicious of the very idea of a leap (Rae 1997).
9 Habermas (1987: 152–3).
10 Ferreira (1998: 221).
11 Ferreira (1998: 222).
12 For sophisticated discussion of this idea in later Heidegger especially, see Engelland (2017: 183–94).
13 Caputo goes so far as to suggest that *Being and Time* differs "principally in terms of the degree to which Heidegger has formalized and articulated Kierkegaard's ontology in a more systematic, professional manner" (Caputo 1987: 82-3). This goes too far in neglecting neglects the extensive influence which Kant, amongst others, on Heidegger's account of finitude and temporality: even if he were a mere systematiser, Heidegger must be treated as a uniquely syncretic one.
14 I discuss William's brief digression into the language of Haufniensis below.
15 Cappelørn (2008: 133).
16 I use "misery" here as a blanket term covering "depression" and "despair": I address William's understanding of that difference in a moment.
17 Macintyre (1981: 41).
18 Davenport and Rudd (2001) is the *locus classicus*.
19 Compaijen (2018: 207, 211, 226).
20 For current purposes, I equate "Dasein" with "human being": I discuss the details in Golob (2014: 201–2).
21 Dreyfus and Rubin (1991: 332) and Blattner (1999: 80).
22 Blattner (2013: 142).
23 Admittedly, there is one line in which William abruptly lapses into the language of Haufniensis, conceding that "a little depression" is present in every life due to "hereditary sin" (EO II: 190). But this jibes so little with his broader argument that Hannay excised it from his edition of *Either/Or* on the grounds that "to me the interpolation seemed out of character" (Hannay 2008: 150).
24 Furtak (2005: 82–3).
25 Annas (1993: 55).
26 Withy (2012: 196).
27 Macintyre (1981: 126).
28 For discussion of the various Heideggerian responses to this worry, see Golob (2017).
29 Davenport (2001: 92).
30 For detailed discussion of these options see Golob (forthcoming).
31 [Acknowledgements].

Bibliography

Abbreviations: Kierkegaard

CoA *The Concept of Anxiety*. Ed./trans. R. Thomte and A. Anderson (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1980)

CUP *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*. Ed./trans. H.V. Hong and E.A. Hong (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1992)

EO I *Either/Or: Part One*. Ed./trans. H.V. Hong and E.A. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)

EO II *Either/Or: Part Two*. Ed./trans. H.V. Hong and E.A. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)

JP *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers: Volumes 1–6*. Eds./trans.

H.V. Hong and E.A. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978).

SuD *The Sickness unto Death*. Eds./trans. H.V. Hong and E.A. Hong (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983).

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Abbreviations: Heidegger

References are to the standard *Gesamtausgabe* edition (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975–; abbreviated as Ga), with the exception of BT, where I use the standard text (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1957). Where I have used a specific translation, I list it below: since all show the *Gesamtausgabe* pagination marginally I have not given both.BT *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957); *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962)

Ga3	*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1998)
Ga5	*Holzwege* (1977)
Ga17	*Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (2006)
Ga18	*Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (2002); *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. R. Metcalf and M. Tanzer (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2009)
Ga20	*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (1979); *History of the Concept of Time*, trans. T. Kisiel (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992)
Ga27	*Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1996)
Ga29/30	*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (1983); *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995)
Ga54	*Parmenides* (1982); *Parmenides*, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1992).
Ga65	*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1989);
Ga94	*Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)* (2014)

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